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INTRODUCTION
U.S. prosecutors are difficult to type. The 40,000 or so federal, state,
and local prosecutors occupy many and varied investigative,
administrative, and litigation functions. Also variable, and sometimes
misleading, are the labels used to describe the legal and ethical roles of
the prosecutor. Prosecutors have been called “Champions of the
People,”1 “Ministers of Justice,”2 “Courtroom Warriors,”3 and even
* Professor of Law, Pace University. I am grateful, as always, for the insights from my
colleague, Professor Lissa Griffin. I also wish to thank the participants in the Criminal Justice
Ethics Schmooze held at Fordham Law School in June 2014 for their valuable comments.
1. See Mr. District Attorney on the Job, BIG LITTLE BOOKS, http://www.biglittlebooks.
com/dist_attorney.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2014) (describing the popular NBC radio show, “Mr.
District Attorney,” which first aired on April 3, 1939 and glorified the public prosecutor).
2. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2013) (stating that a prosecutor has
the responsibility of “a minister of justice”).
3. See RICHARD O’CONNOR, COURTROOM WARRIOR: THE COMBATIVE CAREER OF WILLIAM
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“Avengers.”4 They have been described as “virtuous,”5 “prudent,”6
“ethical,”7 “good,”8 “neutral,”9 “unique,”10 and “gamesmen.”11 But
there is one persona that seems to have eluded characterization and
commentary: the prosecutor as a bully. In fact, one of the most
prominent features of U.S. prosecutors is their ability to threaten,
intimidate, and embarrass anyone—defendants, witnesses, lawyers—
without any accountability, or apology. This is the conduct of a bully.
The idea to write about prosecutorial threats and bullying came from
the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal’s conference on sentencing
and punishment.12 In presenting remarks about prosecutorial discretion
in sentencing, I was struck more than ever by how U.S. prosecutors
employ their vast charging and sentencing powers to coerce defendants
to plead guilty and cooperate, with the most dire consequences if they
refuse: “sentences so excessively severe they take your breath away,” as
one federal judge recently observed.13 This phenomenon is hardly new
or sudden.14 But in recent years, the power of prosecutors to inflict

TRAVERS JEROME 1 (1963) (describing the career of New York District Attorney William Travers
Jerome, also referred to as a “Dragon-Slayer on the Bench”).
4. JEANINE PIRRO, TO PUNISH AND PROTECT 1 (2003).
5. See Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15
AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 201 (1988) (discussing whether prosecutors are capable of being virtuous).
6. See Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 259 (2001)
(arguing that prosecutorial discretion is not the same as moral discretion and that a good
prosecutor needs to be prudent of office procedures and policies to avoid disciplinary sanctions).
7. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor’s Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 500,
551–61 (1987) (describing the pressure on prosecutors to be ethical).
8. See Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets
Brady, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1133, 1135 (2005) (discussing the expectation that the “ethical”
prosecutor is a realizable model for the “good” prosecutor); Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good
Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 359 (2001) (recognizing that
most people believe prosecutors are “the good guys”).
9. See H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a
Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1696 (2000) (explaining that the investigative
responsibility requires neutrality).
10. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88
GEO. L.J. 207, 210 (2000) (describing how federal prosecutors are “ethically unique”).
11. See Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 565 (2007) (arguing that prosecutors have learned to bend rules in a
“sporting event” fashion).
12. The Loyola University Chicago Law Journal held its Symposium, entitled “Sentence
Structure: Elements of Punishment” on April 4, 2014.
13. United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
14. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 257–60
(2011) (describing how the last several decades have witnessed much more powerful sentencing
laws—mandatory minimums, three-strikes laws, and sentence enhancements—that give
prosecutors more power than ever before to more easily induce guilty pleas and impose harsher
sentences).
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ultra-harsh punishments—often for minor drug offenses—has attracted
increasing scrutiny from courts, commentators, and lawmakers.15 The
greatest concern is the ability of prosecutors to bring criminal charges
carrying mandatory minimum sentences and then to enhance the already
severe punishment if the defendant persists in refusing to plead guilty,
without offering any cogent or coherent explanation for this seemingly
arbitrary use of power.16
But the prosecutor’s use of threats and coercion is not limited to
sentencing. Prosecutors throughout every stage of the criminal justice
process have the power to threaten and bully anyone who is at the
prosecutors’ mercy: defendants, witnesses, attorneys, and even judges.
The exercise of this power is often done recklessly and, as with bullies
generally, with a wanton disregard for the sensibilities of the persons
being abused. To be sure, some of these threats and bullying might
appear as a necessary, if overly aggressive, means of investigating and
prosecuting crime. Prosecutors often encounter persons who refuse to
cooperate, claim not to remember details, are reluctant to incriminate a
friend or relative, or are afraid of retribution. Prosecutors are in the
business of convicting guilty people and this compelling objective
15. See, e.g., Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 420, 438 (stating that federal prosecutors use
sentencing powers as “sledgehammer” and “two-by-four to the forehead” to coerce guilty pleas);
United States v. Young, 960 F. Supp. 2d 881, 882 (N.D. Iowa 2013) (“[D]eeply disturbing, yet
often replayed, shocking, dirty little secret of federal sentencing: the stunningly arbitrary
application by the Department of Justice (DOJ) of § 851 drug sentencing enhancements.”);
Smarter Sentencing Act, S. 1410, 113th Cong. (2013) (enlarging safety valve relief from drug
offense mandatory minimums); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AN OFFER YOU CAN’T REFUSE: HOW
U.S. FEDERAL PROSECUTORS FORCE DRUG DEFENDANTS TO PLEAD GUILTY 1–2 (2013)
[hereinafter AN OFFER YOU CAN’T REFUSE], available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/reports/us1213_ForUpload_0_0_0.pdf (detailing how federal prosecutors extract guilty pleas
by threatening to charge them with harsh mandatory sentences); Gerard E. Lynch, Screening
Versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are We Trading Off?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1399, 1402
(2003) (“[I]t is hard to take seriously the notion that ninety percent of those serving our
remarkably heavy sentences are the beneficiaries of ‘bargains’”); Eric H. Holder, Attorney
General, Keynote Address at the Vera Institute of Justice’s Third Annual Justice Address (July 9,
2009) (“We know that people convicted of drug possession or the sales of small amounts of drugs
comprise a significant portion of the prison population. Indeed, in my thirty years of law
enforcement, I have seen far too many young people lose their claim to a future by committing
non-violent drug crimes.”).
16. See Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 434–36 (finding that the plea was coerced and rejecting
prosecutor’s claim of making “individualized assessment” as disingenuous “patter,” reflecting
“lack of candor,” and evincing an effort to save face after defendant refused to plead guilty
initially); United States v. Jones, No. CR 08-0887-2, 2009 WL 2912535, at *5–7 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
9, 2009) (concluding that the prosecutor failed to offer a cogent explanation for coercive threats
that constituted “preemptive ultimatum” and failed to explain terms of plea agreement); AN
OFFER YOU CAN’T REFUSE, supra note 15, at 8–11 (describing several cases involving harsh
consequences of prosecutors making good on threats but refusing to comment on whether they
thought resulting sentence was just or to even explain why defendant such harsh sentence).
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requires prosecutors to sometimes use their considerable leverage,
including threats, to induce people to assist law enforcement. But
sometimes the threats are not aimed at legitimate law enforcement
objectives. In several of the cases discussed below,17 the prosecutor’s
threats often appear to be gratuitous, unduly abusive, humiliating, and
without any legal justification.18
Determining whether a threat is legitimate or illegitimate is often
difficult. Threats may be tacit, and even made in a seemingly benign
manner suggesting prosecutorial benevolence rather than oppression.
Moreover, just because a court may find that a threat is legally
permissible does not necessarily mean that the threat is an appropriate
form of prosecutorial behavior. To make matters worse, some courts
not only find threats legally permissible, but also encourage their use.19
In many instances, however, threats cannot be justified as a legitimate
law enforcement tactic, and as with bullying generally, almost always
inflict some type of harm. In the end, prosecutors, like all bullies, make
threats because they have the power to do so; the people they threaten
are at their mercy, and they have the legal weapons to back up their
threats with sometimes devastating consequences.
17. See infra Part I (discussing several hypothetical cases of prosecutorial bullying, all based
on real-life situations).
18. The language that prosecutors use often reveals the language of a bully. For example, a
prosecutor who promoted herself as an “avenger” for victims described her job this way: “I often
have to deal with slime.” PIRRO, supra note 4, at 6. Her solution to prosecuting criminals was
blunt: “Cage the bastards.” Id. The notorious “Perp Walk,” masterminded by former federal
prosecutor and later New York City mayor Rudolph Giuliani, spotlighted the plight of the whitecollar criminal at the prosecutor’s mercy, who even though innocent, or presumed innocent, was
publicly humiliated, and his reputations ruined. See infra note 46 and accompanying text
(discussing prosecutors’ use of the “Perp Walk”). Closely studying arguments by prosecutors is
also illuminating. A prosecutor’s summation often features abusive and ridiculing name-calling,
the trademark of a bully. See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 169 (1986) (“animal”);
United States v. Cook, 432 F.2d 1093, 1095 (7th Cir. 1970) (“subhuman man with rancid, rotten
mind, a true monster” (internal citations omitted)); Volkmor v. United States, 13 F.2d 594, 595
(6th Cir. 1926) (“cheap, scaly, slimy crook”); United States v. Wolfson, 322 F. Supp. 798, 798
(D. Del. 1971) (“crook,” “viruses” and “germs”). The incendiary rhetoric used by the Arizona
county prosecutor in attacking persons who were at his mercy, and whom he knew were unable to
respond to his attacks, is the hallmark of the bully. See infra note 35 and accompanying text
(discussing Arizona prosecutor Andrew Thomas). The “macho culture” in some prosecutor
offices likely contributes to bullying tactics. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation With Federal
Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 957–58
(1999) (explaining how some prosecutors “yell and scream,” they engage in the “confrontational
approach,” and claim “You have to break the guy down”).
19. E.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978) (holding that it was
permissible for a prosecutor to threaten to re-indict defendant on more serious charges for
refusing to plead guilty); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1033, 1043 (D. Md. 1976)
(describing the prosecutor’s duty to make a witness aware that there may be adverse
consequences to witness’s evasions).
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Part I of this Essay describes ten contexts in which prosecutors make
threats and behave like bullies. Some of these contexts are familiar,
such as grand jury proceedings or plea discussions, where threats are
generally upheld. Threats in other contexts are not as easy to justify,
such as threats to obtain testimony from prosecution witnesses,
retaliating for the exercise of constitutional rights, forcing a waiver of
civil rights claims, and publicly humiliating people. Other threats
clearly are illegitimate and unethical, such as threats that drive defense
witnesses off the stand, bringing criminal charges against outspoken
critics and defense experts, and threats to charge corporations unless
they refuse to pay the legal fees of employees. Then, Part II examines
the legitimacy and illegitimacy of threats, provides a framework for
analyzing the legitimacy of threats, and uses this framework to
determine whether a prosecutor’s threats have crossed the line.
I. THREATS AND BULLYING
Given the contemporary focus on bullying—in schools, workplaces,
the military, and elsewhere—it occurred to me that bullying might be an
apt window through which to examine several areas of criminal
procedure where prosecutors threaten and bully to implement various
discretionary decisions, particularly to force people to relinquish rights
and comply with the prosecutor’s demands. As shown below, a
prosecutor’s threats and bullying pervade virtually every stage of the
criminal justice process. These examples are designed to illustrate the
most common instances where threats and bullying occur. The
problems have been created for purposes of exploring the subject. They
are based on real cases.
A. Intimidating Grand Jury Witnesses20
A federal grand jury is investigating a state senator for corruption.
The focus of the probe is on the relationship between the senator and a
wealthy real estate developer, and whether the developer made large
financial contributions to the senator’s re-election campaign in return
for the senator’s help in avoiding onerous licensing, construction, and
development requirements.
The prosecutor served grand jury
subpoenas on the senator requiring him to produce numerous documents
related to his political and senatorial work. The prosecutor also
subpoenaed the senator’s longtime chief of staff to testify about several
encounters between the senator and the developer in which the parties
20. See BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT §§ 2:2–2:8 (2d ed. Supp.
2013–2014) (discussing grand jury misconduct).
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discussed the construction project.
The prosecutor advises the chief of staff that he is not a target of the
investigation, but he refuses to testify. To compel his testimony, the
prosecutor grants him immunity, and advises him that his refusal to
testify can be punished with contempt, and that if he testifies falsely, he
can be charged with perjury. The chief of staff agrees to testify, but
claims he does not recall any conversations with the senator related to
the financial arrangement with the developer. He is shown an email he
wrote immediately after one of the meetings, and is asked again to
recount the meeting. He again claims he does not remember.
The prosecutor, in an extremely agitated tone of voice exclaims:
“You know you are lying. Don’t insult this grand jury. You’ll be in jail
in a heartbeat unless you tell the truth. You’ll be finished. You will
never work again.”
Are the prosecutor’s threats a legitimate exercise of prosecutorial
power? Do these threats enhance or degrade the prosecutor’s ethical
duty to serve justice?
B. Coercing Guilty Pleas21
Nancy Morris was charged with possession with intent to distribute
fifty grams of crack cocaine. The charge carries a mandatory minimum
sentence of ten years.22 Morris has a troubled history. She was
sexually abused as a child, overcame a crack addiction, earned a college
degree, and was gainfully employed until she found herself in an
abusive relationship and again became addicted to crack.
Morris had two previous state marijuana arrests, pleaded guilty to
both, and was sentenced to probation on one conviction and a $100 fine
on the other. Pursuant to a policy for drug prosecutions, the prosecutor
advises Morris’s lawyer that he would accept a guilty plea to the drug
charge and the imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence of ten
years. The prosecutor also advises Morris that if she does not plead
guilty within a week, he will file a new complaint adding the prior two
drug convictions that would elevate the mandatory minimum sentence
to twenty years with a maximum punishment of life. 23 The prosecutor
also insists that as part of the “deal,” Morris must agree to pre-trial
detention and make no motions challenging any aspects of the case.
21. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text (presenting cases and other sources
discussing the prevalence and severity of coercion in obtaining guilty pleas).
22. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 created mandatory minimum sentences and enhanced
maximum sentences that are the most prominent features of U.S. drug sentencing. See generally
21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012) (creating mandatory minimum sentences).
23. See id. § 841(b)(1)(A) (providing for a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years).
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Morris refuses to plead guilty and elects to go to trial, where she is
found guilty. At her sentencing, the prosecutor makes good on his
threat, and Morris is sentenced to life imprisonment where she will
probably remain until she dies.
Were the prosecutor’s actions a proper exercise of prosecutorial
power? Even if the prosecutor’s threats are a legally permissible
exercise of power, should there be limits on the use of this power?
C. Attacking Defense Experts24
Barbara Allen, a licensed day care worker, was charged with the
murder of a fifteen-month-old boy in her care. Several doctors testified
for the prosecution that the constellation of head injuries the child
suffered were the result of a diagnosis called Shaken Baby Syndrome.25
Dr. Frank Logan, a forensic pathologist called by the defense, testified
that the cause of death resulted from the child falling and hitting his
head. As the basis for his opinion, Dr. Logan pointed to evidence that
the child, who was just starting to walk, had fallen from a chair in the
kitchen and hit his head on the floor. Pediatric records showed the child
had lost his balance and fallen several times before, and one witness had
seen the child run into a wall and bang his head at a day care center a
few days earlier. Dr. Logan is a critic of Shaken Baby Syndrome and
has written and lectured that the diagnosis has never been scientifically
validated and is an illegitimate label for an often unknown and
ambiguous event. He has testified as a defense witness in several other
cases in which the diagnosis was claimed by the prosecution as the
cause of death. Allen was acquitted.
Shortly after her acquittal, the prosecutor charged Dr. Logan with
three counts of perjury for giving false testimony in the Allen trial that:
(1) Dr. Logan had been asked to write a chapter in a new edition of a
book about child abuse and head injuries; (2) denying that he had ever
testified in the same case as another prosecution-oriented expert; and (3)
his estimate of the amount of money he made giving lectures on Shaken
Baby Syndrome. Logan was acquitted.
Were these charges brought as a legitimate exercise of prosecutorial
discretion? Or were they brought to silence an outspoken prosecution
24. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that
prosecutor’s threats violated employees’ right to counsel and right to substantive due process).
25. Shaken Baby Syndrome is a controversial medical diagnosis that forcible shaking killed an
infant, and this diagnosis often results in a charge of murder. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, The
Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby Syndrome and the Criminal Courts, 87 WASH U. L. REV. 1,
1 (2009) (exploring what ensues when medical certainty underlying science-based prosecutions
dissipates).

GERSHMAN LOYOLA ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE)

108

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

10/31/2014 4:27 PM

[Vol. 46

critic?
D. Bullying Defense Witnesses26
Frank Daly has been charged with conspiracy to distribute drugs. He
has elected to go to trial and seeks to call in his defense a witness named
Sally Long, who Daly claims will testify that Daly was not involved in
the conspiracy. Sally was originally indicted along with Daly, but her
case was dismissed because she was a juvenile. Learning of Sally’s
prospective testimony, the prosecutor sends messages to her through
Daly’s lawyer warning her that if she testifies, she is likely to be
prosecuted for the drug charges that were previously dismissed, that her
testimony will be used against her, and that if she lies, she will be
prosecuted for perjury.
Not content with just these warnings, the prosecutor serves a
subpoena on Sally and has her brought to his office by three federal
agents. There, the prosecutor tells Sally that if she admits she was
involved in the drug ring she will be prosecuted as a juvenile in state or
federal court. Sally takes the witness stand but refuses to answer any
questions relating to the drug ring on the ground that her answers might
incriminate herself.
Was the prosecutor’s conduct in warning Sally of the consequences
of her testifying proper? Could the prosecutor be compelled to grant
Sally immunity to allow her to testify without fear of incrimination?
E. Bullying Prosecution Witnesses27
Michael Thomas witnessed a drive-by shooting outside a bar in
which two people were killed. He told the police that he knew the
victim, but was not sure he could identify the gunman. The police
showed him several photos and he picked out the picture of the person
he believed was the shooter. The prosecutor is preparing the case for
the grand jury against defendant Ted Cruz and tries to contact Thomas
without success. Thomas is asleep at a friend’s house when two
detectives burst into the apartment, roust him from bed, order him to
dress, handcuff him, and escort him to a room in a Holiday Inn Hotel
where he is greeted by a member of the District Attorney’s office who
tells Thomas he will not be allowed to leave unless he cooperates.
The prosecutor informs Thomas that a judge has issued an arrest
warrant to take him into custody as a “material witness,” that he is
26. See infra note 38 and accompanying text (citing cases that included questionable conduct
by the prosecutors in regards to treating witnesses for the defense).
27. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.

GERSHMAN LOYOLA ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

Threats and Bullying by Prosecutors

10/31/2014 4:27 PM

109

required to testify in the grand jury, and that if he refuses to testify
truthfully he will be charged with perjury and obstruction of justice.
The prosecutor also tells Thomas that he would consider dropping a
pending drug charge against Thomas if Thomas cooperated. The
prosecutor reviews the facts and Thomas’s earlier statements to the
police, including Thomas’s identification of Cruz’s photo. The
prosecutor then rehearses the questions he will ask Thomas in the grand
jury. Thomas testifies in the grand jury and identifies Cruz as the killer.
Were the prosecutor’s use of the material witness order, threats to jail
Thomas and charge him with perjury and obstruction of justice, and
promise to drop the drug charges permissible exercises of prosecutorial
power? Even assuming an abuse of prosecutorial power, does the
defendant have any remedy?
F. Compelling Waiver of Civil Rights Claim28
Police Officer Paul Bennett spotted Adam DeRosa sitting on a stoop
and smoking marijuana in Brooklyn, New York. According to Officer
Bennett’s complaint, as he walked up to DeRosa, DeRosa “lunged at
him aggressively, striking him about the face and chest.” However,
according to DeRosa, Bennett approached him and told him to freeze.
As DeRosa stood up, Bennett grabbed him around the neck, threw him
to the ground, handcuffed him, and arrested him for disorderly conduct
and resisting arrest. A bystander supports DeRosa’s account. At
DeRosa’s arraignment, Assistant District Attorney Steven Walsh
confers with DeRosa’s attorney.
Walsh knows that smoking marijuana is a minor offense, that a
bystander claims that the officer used excessive force, and that the
officer’s use of a chokehold may have violated police department
policy. Nevertheless, as Walsh explains to DeRosa’s attorney, Walsh
would agree to dismiss the charges against DeRosa only if DeRosa
agreed not to bring a civil lawsuit against the City, the Police
Department, or Officer Bennett. If DeRosa does not agree, then Walsh
will prosecute DeRosa and, as DeRosa’s attorney reasonably knows,
might result in his client’s conviction.
Was Walsh’s threat to prosecute DeRosa unless DeRosa agreed not to
sue a permissible exercise of prosecutorial power? What factors are
relevant to answer this question?

28. See infra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
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G. Retaliation29
Defendant was charged with one count of income tax fraud. The
venue was placed in the District of Columbia. The defendant moved to
change the venue to California, his state of residence, claiming that the
heavy burden of litigating the case would be alleviated, including the
difficulty and expense of securing counsel far from home, and finding
witnesses, especially character witnesses, who would be unable to travel
to such a distant forum. The prosecutor vigorously opposes the motion,
which the district court nonetheless grants. The prosecutor moves for
reconsideration, advising defendant’s counsel that he is considering
adding new counts and “restructuring” the case against the defendant if
he insisted on his venue rights.
The defendant refuses to accede to the prosecutor’s demand, and the
prosecutor obtains a second indictment based substantially on the same
facts as the first indictment but adding a new count—charging the
defendant with making a false statement to an IRS agent.
Was the prosecutor’s warning to “up the ante” if the defendant
insisted on securing his venue rights a proper exercise of prosecutorial
power? What factors are relevant in answering this question?
H. Demagoguery30
A county prosecutor in Arizona has been waging a bitter campaign of
intimidation and retaliation against judges, lawyers, and municipal
officials who he claims are obstructing his efforts to root out corruption
and prosecute illegal aliens. The judges have ruled against him in
several cases, and the municipal officials have allocated funds for
county building projects but not for law enforcement. The prosecutor
demanded that these judges submit to interviews with members of his
staff, placed members of his staff in their courtrooms to monitor their
conduct, and assigned his chief assistant to “troll” the Internet to look
for suspicious information about the municipal officials, especially their
financial records. He issued press releases publicly attacking the
“cabals” and “factions” of judges and other officials who he claimed
were thwarting his efforts.
Believing that his efforts to silence his critics were unsuccessful, he
convened a grand jury that indicted three of the judges and two county
supervisors on felony charges involving filing false financial statements.
He arrested the supervising criminal court judge for hindering

29. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 35–38 and accompanying text.
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prosecution just before the judge was to rule on a motion to disqualify
the prosecutor for a conflict of interest. He filed a massive Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) conspiracy
complaint against four judges, the entire county legislature, and their
attorneys for engaging in a “pattern of racketeering activities,”
“intimidating and retaliating” against county prosecutors and law
enforcement personnel, “threatening and extorting” the county
prosecutor and his wife, and “corruptly seeking to deny prosecutors
their license to practice law.”
Are the prosecutor’s actions under any circumstances an ethical,
responsible, and effective way to serve justice, enforce the law, and
protect the safety of the community?
I. Shaming31
A federal prosecutor is investigating an investment banker in
connection with a highly publicized Wall Street insider-trading scandal.
The prosecutor summons the banker to his office, with his attorney, to
discuss possible cooperation. The banker appears to have no credible
information that gives the prosecutor any reason to offer him any
benefits. The prosecutor tells the lawyer that he believes his client is
withholding information about criminal conduct by his superiors, and
that if he does not reveal the full extent of his knowledge, he may be
charged with federal crimes. The banker has nothing more to say.
The following week the prosecutor has the banker arrested at his
place of business. Federal marshals handcuff him and forcibly escort
him off the trading floor. The media has been notified and reporters and
photographers surround the man as he is walked out the door and driven
to the police station to be booked and arraigned.
Is the conduct of the prosecutor in publicly humiliating the defendant
a proper exercise of power? What is the prosecutor’s justification for
using this infamous “Perp walk”?
J. Coercing Corporate Cooperation32
Federal authorities are investigating SaniWaste, a corporation
involved in disposing of low-level radioactive waste, for numerous
violations of federal environmental regulations. Three of the top
officials are targets of the probe. It has been SaniWaste’s policy for
many years to pay the legal expenses of its personnel, regardless of cost
and regardless of whether the personnel were charged with crimes. In
31. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
32. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
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the course of its investigation of SaniWaste, the federal prosecutor has
met several times with SaniWaste’s attorneys. The prosecutor explains
that in considering whether to bring criminal charges against a
corporation, federal policy focuses on several different factors, one of
which is whether the corporation has demonstrated a willingness to
cooperate in the investigation. And, according to the federal policy,
corporate cooperation typically is shown by making timely and
voluntary disclosures of wrongdoing and a willingness to assist in the
investigation of its agents and employees, including the waiver of
attorney-client and work product privileges, and the refusal to support
potentially culpable agents and employees through advancing attorneys
legal fees.
Is the prosecutor’s tacit threat a permissible means of encouraging the
corporation’s cooperation?
II. LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE THREATS AND BULLYING
Curiously, despite considerable attention by courts and commentators
to the prosecutor’s conduct generally, and to specific contexts in which
prosecutors are claimed to overreach, there is a marked absence of
commentary that focuses exclusively on the prosecutor’s use of threats
and bullying tactics, and whether this conduct is legitimate or
illegitimate. This absence is even more surprising given that the subject
of bullies and bullying has emerged as a significant topic of
contemporary discourse.33
Searching for ethical guidance on a prosecutor’s use of threats is
equally unavailing. There is certainly a moral dimension to a
prosecutor’s use of threats and behaving like a bully. It is wrong to treat
people that way, even for a prosecutor. But the absence of ethical
oversight is not all that surprising. Indeed, professional disciplinary
bodies probably assume that prosecutors need to use threats to persuade
witnesses to cooperate with law enforcement and tell the truth, and
obtain guilty pleas, while at the same time trying to respect their rights
and sensibilities.34 And these disciplinary bodies probably would
acknowledge that attempting to draw a clear line between permissible
33. See generally EMILY BAZELON, STICKS AND STONES (2014) (exploring teenage bullying);
GARY NAMIE & RUTH NAMIE, THE BULLY AT WORK 111–268 (2000) (teaching employees how
to address workplace bullying); Donna Miles & Tyrone C. Marhsall, Jr., Dempsey: Hazing,
Bullying ‘Intolerable’ in Military, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Dec. 23, 2011), http://www.defense.
gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66590 (highlighting bullying in the military).
34. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2013) (stating that a lawyer must avoid
engaging in conduct that has no other substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or
burden a third party).
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and impermissible threats is either too difficult or unmanageable.
The examples in Part I are used to illustrate the many occasions in
which prosecutors use threats and to provide a context for discussion. I
do not claim that there is a clear and unequivocal answer in any of these
cases to the permissibility of threats, although some of the cases are
much more clear-cut than others. Given the absence of significant
ethical or legal guidance on the subject of prosecutorial threats, I
suggest the following framework for evaluating which threats are
legitimate and which threats constitute impermissible and unethical
bullying.
In order for a prosecutor’s threat to be legally and ethically
legitimate: (1) there must be a legal basis for the threat; (2) the
prosecutor must have a good faith belief that the individual has the
ability to comply; (3) the prosecutor must reasonably believe that the
threat will cause the individual to comply; (4) and the prosecutor must
reasonably believe that the need for the threat in light of legitimate law
enforcement interests outweighs any burden on the rights, interests, and
sensibilities of the person threatened.
Let us revisit the examples of threats presented above. Under the
articulated standard, some threats clearly appear to be beyond the pale,
and even aberrational; there is no need for moral guidance or close
scrutiny into the legitimacy of these threats. These cases expose, in
different ways, the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s awesome
powers, and how bullying tactics can enhance or supplement the
prosecutor’s already virtually unlimited and uncontrolled discretion.
The most outrageous example of bullying is the conduct of the Arizona
county prosecutor who charged judges, municipal officials, and lawyers
with serious crimes—indeed, virtually every person who publicly
challenged his authority.35 There are legitimate ways to respond to a
judge who makes a ruling adverse to a prosecutor, or a lawmaker who
35. See Arizona v. Wilcox, No. CR-2010-005423-001, slip op. at 3–4 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Feb.
24, 2010) available at http://blogs.phoenixnewtimes.com/valleyfever/thomas%20rulin
g%20wilcox.PDF (disqualifying Andrew Thomas based on conflict of interest in retaliating
against members of Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, prosecuting people for political
reasons, targeting members of board for political reasons, and misusing power by his alliance
with Maricopa Sheriff Arpaio); Terry Carter, The Maricopa Courthouse War, A.B.A. J. 43, 44–
49 (2010) (discussing the political showdown at the Maricopa Courthouse); Sarah Fenske,
Andrew Thomas, Joe Arpaio Dismiss RICO Claim Against County Officials—Ask Justice
Department to Investigate Instead, PHOENIX NEW TIMES (Mar. 11, 2010, 12:48 PM),
http://blogs.phoenixnewtimes.com/valleyfever/2010/03/thomas_arpaio_dismiss_rico_cla.php
(covering the dismissal of the suit); Michael Kiefer & JJ Hensley, Andrew Thomas Files Criminal
Charges Against Judge, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Dec. 10, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral/
news/election/azelections/articles/2009/12/09/20091209donahoecomplaint1209-ON.html
(highlighting the charges against The Honorable Gary Donahoe).
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makes policy choices adverse with a prosecutor’s. Appealing the
judge’s ruling, or enlisting law enforcement allies to propose remedial
legislation are obvious recourses. But bringing outlandish criminal and
civil charges against these individuals in the context of an inflammatory
political campaign appears to be undertaken without any valid legal
purpose and solely to retaliate and punish opponents for their
opposition, and cause untold harm to them, their families, and the
justice system generally. These prosecutors should be punished, even
disbarred, as the Arizona prosecutor eventually was.36
By the same token, some threats appear to be gratuitous exercises of
unconstrained power and evince an all-out effort to insult, humiliate,
and intimidate: the telltale sign of a bully. I refer to the prosecutor’s
indictment of an expert witness for perjury based on the defense
expert’s seemingly innocuous testimony about his credentials and other
peripheral and immaterial details. The fact that these charges were
brought right after the defendant’s acquittal for the murder of a child
suggests that the prosecutor’s motive was to retaliate against the expert
and silence him.37 Any legal basis for the charges is minimal, the
prosecutor’s good faith purpose clearly is suspect, and the impact on the
expert’s right to pursue his calling and provide critical testimony for a
defendant charged with murder outweighs any arguable interest by the
prosecutor in vindicating the rule of law or exposing perjury.
Also illegitimate are threats that appear to have no recognizable law
enforcement purpose except to punish or deter persons from exercising
their constitutional rights. Thus, driving a defense witness off the stand
with inflammatory threats of bringing criminal charges against the
witness—including perjury—is a gratuitous exercise of power whose
purpose is not to caution the witness about her rights and obligations but
to intimidate the witness into refusing to testify. 38 By the same token,
36. See John Rudolf, Andrew Thomas, Phoenix Prosecutor, Disbarred For “Defiled” Public
Trust, HUFF. POST (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/11/andrew-thomasdisbarred-phoenix-prosecutor_n_1415815.html (reporting on Andrew Thomas’ disbarment).
37. See Mark Hansen, Battle of the Expert: A Forensic Pathologist Successfully Fights
Criminal Charges Stemming From His Testimony in a Shaken Baby Case, 91 A.B.A. J. 54, 56–7
(2005) (discussing the false swearing charge of Dr. John Plunkett).
38. See United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 228 (3d Cir. 1976) (reversing because
prosecutor’s actions infringed defendant’s constitutional rights); People v. Shapiro, 409 N.E.2d
897, 905 (N.Y. 1980) (citing prosecutorial misconduct by threatening witnesses). A prosecutor
has no obligation to grant immunity to a defense witness and a court cannot compel the
prosecutor to do so. See United States v. Quinn, 728 F.3d 243, 254 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that
the grant of witness immunity is reserved for the executive branch and is not for the judicial
branch to decide); see also Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 97–98 (1972) (finding a violation of due
process for a judge to gratuitously single out a defense witness for a lengthy admonition on
dangers of perjury and effectively driving witness off the stand).
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advising a corporation to throw its employees to the wolves by refusing
to pay their legal fees or face criminal prosecution is a gratuitous threat
that has no legal basis, and is an abuse of prosecutorial power and
discretion. The prosecutor knowingly violates the right to counsel of
the corporate employees, as well as their fundamental right to due
process.39 Even assuming the government’s interest in securing the
corporation’s cooperation is valid, this interest is clearly outweighed by
the burden on the rights of the employees.
Some prosecutorial bullying is probably legally permissible even if it
is troubling as an ethical matter. Prosecutors are authorized to use
mandatory minimum sentences and enhanced punishments to coerce
repeat offenders to plead guilty. 40 However, the resulting sentence is so
harsh that some prosecutors probably would concede that the harm they
inflict is disproportionate to the offense, especially against low-level
drug offenders.41 Some plea bargain threats, however, clearly are out of
bounds, such as forcing a defendant to submit to pre-trial detention and
make no pre-trial motions. These threats have no legal basis and are
used to intimidate the defendant into forfeiting nearly all of his
constitutional rights.42
Also ethically troubling is the heavy-handed treatment of
uncooperative grand jury witnesses43 and threatening prosecution
witnesses with punitive consequences unless they tell the truth.44 These
threats and bullying tactics would probably pass the legitimacy test.
The prosecutor has a legal basis for issuing these threats—to persuade
reluctant witnesses to cooperate with law enforcement—and there is a
reasonable basis to believe that the threats will cause the witness to

39. E.g., United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding
prosecutor’s threats violated employees’ right to counsel and right to substantive due process).
40. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361 (1978) (holding that a prisoner’s due
process was not violated when a state prosecutor carried out a threat made during plea
negotiations).
41. Attorney General Eric H. Holder last year announced a new “Department Policy on
Charging Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Recidivist Enhancements in Certain Drug Cases.”
The new policy reflects both the unfairness of the using harsh mandatory sentences against lowlevel drug offenders and the unnecessary expense from the current regime. See Charlie Savage,
Justice Department Seeks to Curtail Stiff Drug Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2013, at A1
(reporting on Eric Holder’s speech about the impact of the United States’ high incarceration rate).
42. E.g., United States v. Jones, No. CR 08-0887-2 MHP, 2009 WL 2912535, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 9, 2009) (prosecutor violated defendant’s due process rights by attempting to have her
waive nearly all constitutional rights before entering plea).
43. See GERSHMAN, supra note 20, §§ 2:2–2:8 (discussing grand jury misconduct).
44. See Joaquin Sapien, A Powerful Legal Tool, and Its Potential For Abuse, PROPUBLICA
(Aug. 16, 2013, 8:41 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/a-powerful-legal-tool-and-itspotential-for-abuse (writing about the abuse of material witness orders).
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reveal truthful information about criminal wrongdoing. 45 Moreover, the
balance between offending the sensibilities of people and obtaining
relevant and truthful evidence would likely tip in favor of truth and
effective prosecution. Also ethically troubling, but sustained by courts,
is the public shaming of individuals arrested for white-collar offenses.
The “Perp walk” has been justified as a means of deterring white collar
crime and sending a message to the public that this type of crime will be
treated no differently from crimes of violence, to wit, with equal law
enforcement aggressiveness.46
The release-dismissal threats are more difficult to justify—but may
pass the test of legitimacy. The prosecutor’s purpose in seeking a
release-dismissal is a relevant consideration, and so no hard and fast
rule is possible. The prosecutor may be using the tacit threat of
prosecution to protect the exposure of government misconduct.47 That
use would be clearly illegitimate. But the prosecutor might also be
seeking to avoid an unnecessary prosecution, conserve scarce resources,
and prevent a meritless civil lawsuit.48
By the same token, a prosecutor’s apparently vindictive threat to
increase charges after a defendant has exercised a right is also
problematic, but may again depend on the prosecutor’s excuse for his
conduct, such as the need in the early stages of a case to reevaluate the
evidence and reformulate the charges. Thus, threats to add charges in
the pre-trial setting almost always escape censure, unless it is clear that
the prosecutor’s primary purpose is to prevent or punish the defendant’s
exercise of constitutional rights.49
As noted above, the prosecutor’s threats in almost every case may

45. Of course, the threats might induce a witness to give false testimony. See Yaroshefsky,
supra note 18, at 918 (highlighting the concerns of eliciting false testimony from the perspective
of a former Assistance U.S. Attorney). Moreover, it is questionable whether a defendant has a
constitutional remedy against the admission of a coerced third-party statement. See Katherine
Sheridan, Excluding Coerced Witness Testimony to Protect a Criminal Defendant’s Right to Due
Process of Law and Adequately Deter Police Misconduct, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1221, 1247
(2011) (noting that the Supreme Court has yet to rule on this question).
46. See Caldarola v. County of Westchester, 343 F.3d 570, 577 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding
“Perp walk”). But see Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202, 216 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding violation due
to fictional creation of “Perp walk”).
47. E.g., Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (striking down
“odious” agreement as evincing “illegitimate desire to protect the two police officers”).
48. E.g., Town of Newton v. Rummery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (refusing to adopt a per se
rule and enforcing release-dismissal agreement as it was voluntary and did not violate public
policy).
49. See United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224, 1227–28 (9th Cir. 1977) (dismissing new
charge because appearance of prosecutorial vindictiveness chilled exercise of invoking venue
rights); see also GERSHMAN, supra note 20, §§ 4:34–4:68 (abuse of charging function).
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burden the recipient’s constitutional rights, but that burden must be
balanced against the government’s interests. Plea-bargaining threats
burden one’s right to trial; coercing corporate cooperation burdens their
right to counsel and the right to fair criminal process; threats that drive
defense witnesses off the stand burden the defendant’s right to
compulsory process; release-dismissal threats burden a defendant’s First
Amendment right to redress government misconduct; retaliatory and
vindictive threats burden due process; demagogic threats burden the
right to be free of government oppression; coercing testimony of
prosecution witnesses burdens a defendant’s right to a fair trial; threats
to grand-jury witnesses and abuse of subpoenas burdens due process;
attacking a defense expert burdens the expert’s First Amendment right
to free speech and the defendant’s right to a fair trial; and shaming a
person arrested burdens the right to privacy and the presumption of
innocence.
CONCLUSION
Prosecutors use threats and bullying in virtually every stage of the
criminal justice process. Despite the increased attention in U.S. society
to the incidence of bullying and the harm inflicted by bullies, it is
surprising that so little attention has been given to the conduct of
prosecutors in using threats and bullying. Whether a prosecutor’s
threats and bullying is a legitimate or illegitimate exercise of power is
rarely clear-cut. This Essay describes ten contexts in which threats and
bullying are used. Some of these situations include threats that courts
probably would permit, and even encourage. But several of the
situations exceed any proper purpose for the use of threats.
In discussing the prosecutor’s use of threats, I have proposed a
framework to ascertain whether threats are legitimate or not. For threats
to be legitimate, the prosecutor must have a legal basis for the threat, the
prosecutor must have a good faith belief that the individual has the
ability to comply, the prosecutor must reasonably believe that the threat
will cause the individual to comply, and the prosecutor must reasonably
believe that the need for the threat outweighs any burden on the
individual’s rights, interests, and sensibilities. Under this test, threats
that are used to discover probative evidence of crime by forcing
witnesses to reveal relevant and truthful testimony, or to persuade
defendants to plead guilty, are typically allowed, even though their use
may be ethically troubling. These threats serve valid law enforcement
interests in deterring crime, convicting guilty people, and conserving
limited resources. Other threats, such as forcing persons to waive
rights, retaliating after the exercise of rights, and publicly shaming them
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are far more questionable but usually are allowed by courts.
Some threats, however, are clearly beyond the pale. For many of
these threats there is clearly no legal basis, and the prosecutor is using
the threat for illegitimate law enforcement purposes, sometimes for selfserving reasons. Examples include bringing criminal charges against
persons who are political enemies or outspoken critics, threatening to
charge defense witnesses if they seek to testify for a defendant, or
threatening corporations with sanctions if they provide legal fees for
employees. These threats are abusive, humiliating, and involve the
gratuitous infliction of harm. These threats resemble the conduct of a
bully.

